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RESUMEN: 
El objeto de este artículo es establecer que aunque Thomas Reid 
utiliza su versión de realismo del valor como arma con la que combatir 
el nominalismo del valor de David Hume, en un nivel más profundo de 
análisis, el realismo de uno y el nominalismo del otro son plenamente 
compatibles. 
SUMMARY: 
The purpose of this paper is to establish that although that Thomas 
Reid uses his version of value realism as a weapon with which to beat 
David Hume's value nominalism, at a deeper leve1 of analysis the realisrn 
of the one and the nominalism of the other are fully compatible. 
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My aim is to discuss an apparently irreconciliable disagreement 
betweem two philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment conceming the 
metaphysical status of values. One of the philosophers is Hume and the 
other is Thomas Reid. 1 shall expound the disagreement and shall then 
seek to demonstrate that though Reid took himself to be presenting a 
doctrine on values that was incompatible with Hume's, a closer exami- 
nation reveals that on this topic the apparently sceptical position of Hume 
and the common sense position of Reid are fully consistent with each 
other. 1 shall begin by putting the main terms of the dispute into a broader 
metaphysical context, one with which our two protagonists were very 
familiar. Identifying the nature of the context will prove helpful as 
indicating the route to reconciliation. 
Philosophers seek to determine the location of the objects they study. 
Among the objects of perennial interest to philosophers are universals, 
the common natures shared by many things in virtue of which they are 
members of a single species. But where are universals? Where for exam- 
ple is cathood, the common nature shared by al1 cats? The obvious answer 
is that it is in every cat, and nowhere else. But some have disputed this, 
and argued that the universal in question does not exist in the outer world, 
in cats, but is in the human beings who classify the animals. According 
to this view the universal is a principie of classification, and therefore 
has the metaphysical status of a concept in the mind of the classifier.1 
Thus in discussing universals, a chief question has concerned their lo- 
cation are they outside or inside? In the real world or in our minds? 
A second example of the interest in location concems truth. In 
medieval discussions of truth the same question emerges: Where is it? 
1s truth in the world or is it in the intellect of the person who looks out 
upon the world and forms propositions about it? Thomas Aquinas, as 
interested as anyone in the location of truth, declared it to be primarily 
in the intellect and secondarily in things known by the intellect.2 But this 
doctrine was stated by him against a background of support for the 
contrary position. 
And one further exarnple of the interest in location concerns time. 
On the one hand there are strong grounds for locating time in the outer 
world, and Aristotle provides powerful arguments for doing so.3 But there 
are also arguments, especially associated with St Augustine, for linking 
time so closely to the stream of consciousness as in effect to locate time 
1. For an illuminating discussion of this view see: KATHERINE H. TACHAU, Vision and 
Certitude in the Age o f  Ockham, Leiden 1988, ch. 5.  
2. Summa Theologiae 1 ,  16, 1 .  
3. Physics IV 10-14. 
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within the mind.4This would require us to say that a world absolutely 
devoid of conscious beings would not be a temporal world. This latter 
position may at first hearing seem indefensible, yet if we try to make 
sense of there being a now in a world lacking conscious beings for whom 
now is now, we might begin to see that there are indeed things to be said 
on behalf of the Augustinian position. 
We have here, therefore, three of the deepest concepts discussed by 
philosophers, universality, truth and time, and a major issue in each case 
is whether to locate the corresponding objects in the inner or the outer 
world, in the mind or in physical reality. Two great schools of philoso- 
phers are defined by the way they answer these questions. Those who 
locate these objects in what most people like to think of as reality are 
called realists, and those who locate them in the mind are nominalists. 
Of course a philosopher might be realist about universals and nominalist 
about say, time, but as a historical fact there is a tendency for each 
philosopher to be inclined in a rather general way towards one school 
ot the other. 
It seems therefore that at the heart of philosophy there is a concem 
with the dichotomy 'innerlouter'. What is in the inner world, that of the 
mind, and what in the outer, that of physical reality? In view of this 
preoccupation with the general question of location of objects and the 
specific focus within that enquiry upon the 'innerlouter' dichotomy, it 
comes as no surprise to discover that philosophers have approached the 
concept of value by asking questions conceming the location of value 
and by bringing the 'innerlouter' dichotomy to bear upon that enquiry. 
And just as the dispute over whether time is inner or outer is personified 
by St Augustine and Aristotle, and as the dispute over whether universals 
are inner or outer is personified by Ockham and Wyclif, so also that over 
whether values are inner or outer is personified by Hume and Reid. We 
are plainly dealing here with an aspect of one of the great themes in the 
westem philosophical tradition. 
What case can be made out for saying that values are inner? There 
are of course values of different sorts, moral, aesthetic, religious, eco- 
nomic, and so on. Hume's discussion of moral values is a locus classicus 
for the claim that values are essentially inside the mind,s and 1 shall tum 
4. See for example Confessions 26 where St Augustine writes: 'It seems to me, then, 
that time is merely an extension, though of what it is an extension 1 do not know. 1 begin 
to wonder whether it is an extension of the mind itself'. 
5 .  A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1967, Book 3, Part 1 .  
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now to his discussion, taking as my starting point the fact that al1 Hume's 
philosophical doctrines have a psychological angle; the question of the 
location of values certainly calls for reference to the facts of our psy- 
chological nature, since identifying the faculty by which we come to 
acquire knowledge of the existence of values will provide us with a clue 
to heir location, or at least it will provide confirmation of our answer 
if we reach that by some other route. The identity of the relevant faculty 
was a problem well recognised in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- 
turies, and one answer, especially associated with Samuel Clarke, was 
that the values of things are a discovery of reason.6Hume famously made 
a distinction between two sorts of reasoning, reasoning about relations 
between ideas and about matters of fact.7 Reasoning about relations 
between ideas is found paradigmatically in mathematics and deductive 
logic. Given a set of propositions and set of rules of valid inference, a 
conclusion can be deduced which is necessary if the premisses are 
necessary. To reach the conclusion we do not need to consult our senses 
or to trust an authority; it is sufficient to apply those rules of inference 
to those propositions. By arguing in this way we can establish that the 
interna1 angles of a triangle equal two right angles, and that two is the 
cube root of eight. These are the kinds of judgments that we make when 
we reason about the relations between ideas, and, as Hume points out, 
judgements of these kinds cannot of themselves move us to act. Of course 
an arithmetical truth will lead us to act in one way rather than another, 
as for example when it comes to our giving change or repaying a debt. 
But the mere knowledge of the arithmetical truth will not motivate us; 
it can at most give direction to the will if we have a desire to give the 
correct change or to repay the debt. Given the presence of the desire, 
reasoning about relations between ideas guides us as to what to do, but 
Hume's point is that without the desire the arithmetical judgment would 
never result in any act. This fact about truths of reason contrast with 
moral judgments, judgments to the effect that given acts are virtuous or 
vicious, right or wrong, which do move us to act. If deductive reasoning 
cannot motivate us, and moral judgments can, then we can never discover 
moral values by reasoning deductively. 
The second sort of reasoning Hume identified is reasoning about 
matters of fact, and for Hume this was essentially causal reasoning. Its 
deliverances are not necessary truths but contingent propositions about 
the existence of things in the world, propositions such as that the sun 
6. A Discourse Concerrzing the Uncheagle Obligations ofNatura1 Religion, London 
1706. Faksimile-Neudruck der Londoner Ausgaben, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964. 
7. Treatise Book 3, Part 1, Sect. 1, p. 463. 
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will rise tomorrow, or that my pen will run out of ink before the end 
of this paragraph. The conclusions of such exercices of reasoning can 
no more move us to act than can conclusions of the kind discussed earlier. 
Learning that something is about to exist will not move us to act unless 
1 want the thing to exist or want it not to, or want to be near it, or distant 
from it, and so on, when it comes into existence. Hence, again, the 
deliverance of reason is not by itself sufficient to motivate us; a desire 
must be in place if the reasoning is to have influence. And again this 
is to be contrasted with judgments of moral value which motivate by their 
nature. 
In any case what matter of fact could the existence of a value be? 
It is not in dispute that we have a natural tendency to locate virtue, vice, 
goodness and wickedness, in agents and their acts, but do we find such 
qualities in the objects when we look for them? It is Hume's contention 
that if we attend only to the act and do not look elsewhere we will not 
find the value. Hume's argument at this point is really no more than an 
invitation to us, though an invitation within the context of a powerfully 
argued theory, to give a description of the act which abstracts entirely 
from our reaction to the act. His contentions that the perceived act will 
be seen to consist of certain physical movements, and also emotions, 
motives, volitions, and thoughts. In the description of the act these 
various elements will have their due place, but so long as we omit from 
the description anything that is a product of our reaction to the act we 
shall say nothing about its virtuousness or viciousness. The other ele- 
ments, the motives, thoughts, and so on, are in the agent, but if the moral 
value is elsewhere, then where? 
When we observe people act we cannot withhold appraisal. Just as 
we cannot look at anything without liking or disliking its appearance, 
or being neutral about it, which is also to appraise it, so also we cannot 
observe a person act without approving or disapproving, or being neutral. 
Hume spoke about liking and disliking, also about approving and di- 
sapproving, and about being pleased and pained, and these dichotomies 
appear to be interchangeable in his writings. When he invites us to look 
for the virtue or vice in an act, but in doing so do disregard anything 
outside the act, such as our reaction to it, it is in particular our placing 
the act on a scale of approval and disapproval that we are to disregard. 
Of course we cannot consider the act and not appraise it; that would cut 
too sharply across our nature. But we can engage in the intellectual 
exercise of noting what in our experience of the act is our reaction to 
it, and then describing the act while not referring to our reaction of 
approval or disapproval. 
These two sorts of reaction are more plausible candidates for being 
the substance of virtue and vice than anything 1 have considered so far, 
for it is of the essence of moral judgements that they motivate us, and 
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our approving and disapproving do that. This is not to imply that when 
we approve or disapprove of an act the virtue or vice is in us. It is to 
say that our judging the act to be virtuous or vicious is nothing more 
than for us to have a particular feeling of approval or disapproval towards 
it. It is to say that a particular kind of pleasure or pain arises in us as 
a result of contemplating the act. We can still describe the act as virtuous 
or vicious, and be speaking as though there is a quality, a moral value, 
in it, but the value's being in the act is simply our affective reaction to 
the act. Its virtue is not, so to say, at a distance from our feelings about 
it. What passes for moral judging is nothing more than the feeling of the 
spectator.These considerations lie behind Hume's dictum that morality 
'is more properly felt than judge oP.8 
There is what we see and there is what we read into what we see, 
and it is Hume's contention that arnong the things we read into what we 
see their value. The idea that we read into things that the things do not 
have of themselves is a basic one for Hume, playing a pivotat role in 
the Treatise, perhaps most farnously in his discussion of the relation 
between a cause and its effect,g where yet again the 'inner/outer' dicho- 
tomy is brought to bear. We judge there to be a necessary connection 
between an event and what we perceive to be its effect, but if we try 
to find the necessary connection by looking at the event and its effect, 
even looking at them repeatedly, we do not see it. We see the cause, and 
we see the effect,and we are aware also of the spatial and temporal 
contiguity of the effect to the cause. And that is all, if we look outward. 
If we tum inward however there is a different story to report, for after 
seeing type-A events invariably followed by type-B events we come to 
form an expectation of B when we see A. But the expectation does not 
stay rooted to the perceiver; it is projected outward by him and is read 
into the relation between the event and its effect. In that form it presents 
itself to us not as an expectation but as a necessary connection between 
the two events. 
We see here the same move as that made by nominalists in connec- 
tion with the location of universals. It may be natural for us to think of 
the universal as having an existence in the outer world, in the things that 
exemplify it, but really it exists in the mind. Likewise with causally 
necessary connection on this nominalists account. Some philosophers 
believe that Hume did not really think that there is such a thing as a 
necessary connection between an event and its effect; but in fact .. he 
could not deny its existence - he thought that our disposition to believe 
in it was an original feature of our nature. The crucial point is that though 
8. Treatise Book 3, Part 1,  Sect. 2, p. 470. 
9. Treatise Book 1 ,  Part 3, Sect. 14. 
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he believed it to exist he did not find it where others were so sure it was, 
namely outside; instead he found it within, in the form of a belief that 
event of type-B will occur when we observe event of type-A.Necessity 
is read into the world and constitutes in part our interpretation of the 
changes that we observe. For necessity to exist in this way in the world 
is for us to impose the category of necessary connection upon the data 
of experience, enabling us to find meaning in what would otherwise be 
a meaningless sequence of irnpressions. In exactly this way the virtue 
and vice of an act should be seen as a projection into the act of our 
approval or disapproval. In this most important respect there is a formi- 
dable consistency of doctrine between Hume's metaphysic of nature and 
his metaphysic of morals. 
It should be added that Hume is no less nominalist in his account 
of non-moral values. A quotation should make the point: 
We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in 
feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that 
it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments conceming al1 kinds 
of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our approbation is imply'd in the 
immediate pleasure they convey to us.10 
A particularly help ful way that 1 have found to grasp this meta- 
physic of value is to see it in terms of the relation between a sentence 
and its meaning. Suppose 1 write the sentence: 'Glasgow is a beautiful 
city', and, in Humean fashion, ask where its meaning is. 1s it in the 
sentence 1 have written? Well, certainly not in the way that the letters 
and words are. Nor in the way that the colour of the ink is. And the 
reason is that the meaning is in no respect physical and therefore is 
not in the sentence in the way that any physical part or feature of 
sentence is. Hume would certainly say that we could never locate the 
meaning it we continue to look outward, and that instead we should 
look inward, to ourselves as understanding the sentence. While it is 
of course permissible to speak about the sentence as having a meaning, 
and therefore to speak in terms of the meaning being in the sentence, 
the metaphysical status of its meaning is that of an act of understan- 
ding. And though that act is in us it is projected outward to the sentence 
from where it presents itself to us as our act of understanding but as 
a property of the sentence, namely its meaning. And just as a sentence 
has meaning only so far as we are disposed to understand it in a given 
way, so also an act is virtuous or vicious only so far as we are disposed 
to approve or disapprove of it in a given way, and a landscape or face 
10. Treatise Book 3, Part 1, Sect. 2, p. 471. 
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is beautiful or ugly only so far as sight of it affords us a given kind 
of pleasure or of pain. And in each case there is nothing to the property 
ascribed to the sentence, act, or landscape over and above a disposition 
on our part, in the case of the sentence a disposition to understand in 
a given way, and in the remaining cases to approve or disapprove of 
what we are attending to. 
It is easy to see that a theory of the kind here expounded lays itself 
open to the charge of articulation a form value scepticism, for it can 
readily be taken to be saying that values do not really exist in any of 
the things to which we ascribe them, and that the illusion that they do 
is due to our natural propensity to project our feelings about outer objects 
into the objects themselves. We have to take this charge seriously, for 
does Hume not commit himself to the doctrine that talk about values of 
outer objects is reducible to talk about our feelings about those objects? 
Thomas Reid certainly thought so, and 1 should like here to attend to the 
main thrust of his attack, which is that Hume's doctrine is contrary to 
common sense. 
The common sense position is that Hume has reversed the true order 
of things in focusing in the way he does upon our affective reactions. 
It is true that when we see a virtuous act or a beautiful object we derive 
a feeling of pleasure, and that there is a necessary and not a merely 
contingent connection between on the one hand judging the act virtuous 
or the object beatiful and on the other hand feeling pleased at what we 
are seeing. But common sense dictates that it is because the act is virtuous 
and the object beautiful that they please us; the virtue and the beauty have 
to be in place for us to respond to them in the particular affective way 
that we do. Why should we be so pleased at the act and the scenery if 
it is not that each embodies a particular form of excellence, in other 
words, a value? The value, therefore, comes first, and the feeling next. 
This is not to say that Hume is wrong to see a necessary connection 
between the value and our feelings, but whereas for Hume the connection 
is one of identity, for Reid the necessity is natural, for our propensity 
to feel pleased at certain excellences in things is due to what he terms 
'the constitution of our nature'." 
What is the reason for saying that this is common sense? Common 
sense principles are principles that al1 men of common understanding 
agree in. The principles do not need proof, nor admit of direct proof.12 
11. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of' Man, 6th edn., William Hamilton (ed.), 
Edinburg 1863, vol. 1, Essay 8, ch. 1, p. 492. 
12. Essays, Essay 1, ch. 2, p. 230. 
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Nevertheless Reid does not mean to deny that evidence can be brought 
forward in justification of the claim that a common sense position is 
indeed common sense, and the chief piece of evidence is linguistic. 
Throughout his philosophical writings we find Reid invoking the linguis- 
tic practice of everybody in support of his philosophical doctrines. 1 say 
'everybody' advisedly for Reid often speaks about features and elements 
that are to be found in 'all' languages, though his use of 'all' here simply I 
reflects his tendency to universalize on the basis of his knowledge of one 
or two European languages. He comments as follows upon the propo- 
sition 'Virgil's Georgics is a beautiful poem': 
Why should 1 use a language that expreses the contrary of what 1 
mean? My language, according to the necessary rules of construction, can 
bear no other meaning but this, that there is something in the poem, and 
not in me, which 1 cal1 beauty. Even those who hold beauty to be merely 
a feeling in the person that perceives it find themselves under a necessity 
of expressing themselves as if beauty were solely a quality of the object, 
and not of the percipient.13 
And Reid is not speaking only about his own linguistic practice. He 
continues: 
No reason can be given why al1 mankind should express themselves 
thus, but that they believe what they say. It is therefore contrary to the 
universal sense of mankind, expressed by their language, that beauty is not 
really in the object, but is merely a feeling in the person who is said to 
perceive it. Philosophers should be very cautions in opposing the common 
sense of mankind; for, when they do, they rarely miss going wrong.14 
And, to quote just one more passage on this central theme of Reid's: 
The common judgment of mankind in this matter sufficiently appears 
in the language of al1 nations, which uniformly ascribes excellence, gran- 
deur, and beauty to the object, and not to the mind that perceives it. ' 5  
Reid's preoccupation with language, not just with vocabulary but 
even more with grarnrnar, is due to his conviction that there is a close 
fit between language and reality. It is because the world is as it is that 
we speak about it in the way we do. Thus the fact that our verbs are tensed 
reflects the temporality of our world, the fact that our verbs are in the 
13. Essays, Essay 8, ch. 1, p. 492. 
14. Ihid. 
15. Essays, Essay 8, ch. 3, p. 495. 
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active or passive voice reflects the fact that there are active powers and 
passive powers, and so on. And the basic form of the proposition, subject 
plus copula plus predicate, reflects the fact that in the world there are 
substances in which attributes inhere. Hence when 1 say 'Glasgow is 
beautiful' or 'Joe Bloggs is wicked', 1 am ascribing a property to Glas- 
gow or to Joe Bloggs. 1 am not talking about myself but about the world. 
Certainly Glasgow and Joe cause me pleasure or pain, but that is because 
my nature is so constituted that when 1 see something beautiful or 
something wicked 1 arn pleased or pained. That is all. 
1 have no reason to suppose that Hume would deny any of the 
linguistic claims that Reid makes, though he might perhaps have demu- 
rred over Reid's tendency to universalize about language. But whether 
or not Reid is correct about features of al1 languages, a question can be 
raised concerning the conclusions to be drawn from the supposedly 
universal linguistic facts. Let us then focus on Reid's affirmation, direc- 
ted as much against Hume as against anyone: 'And the use of al1 lan- 
guages shows that the name of beauty belongs to this excellence of the 
object, and not to the feelings of the spectator'.l6 Would Hume object 
to this? How could he? Reid is telling us that we look at the world, see 
things to have a given aesthetic value, and use subject-predicate propo- 
sitions to declare that value to be a value of the objects, attaching to the 
objects and not to our feelings. Who could object to this account? 1 
believe that Hume's experience of the world and of the values that we 
ascribe to the things in it was not very different from Reid's, and that 
he would not have objected to Reid's account. In line with this belief 
1 shall seek to argue now that Reid's criticism of Hume misses its target, 
and that though Reid's linguistic evidence is to be taken seriously it does 
not prove what he thinks it does. 
Reid sees virtuous acts and beautiful objects, and of course ascribes 
the virtuosness to the acts and the beauty to the objects. Hume does 
likewise. But that things appear to us as beautiful or ugly, virtuous or 
vicious, and so on, prompts a question about the mode of existence of 
the values which we ascribe to things. If Hume propounds any sort of 
value scepticism, he ist at least not at al1 sceptical about the existence 
of values. Of course he thinks values exist, and he regards it as a basic 
feature of our psychological constitution that we see things in terms of 
values, in the sense that he thinks that a human being unable to ascribe 
16. Essays, Essay 8, ch. 4, pp. 499-500. 
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value, whether positive or negative, to anything would lack a human 
perspective upon the world. But knowing that a thing exists does not 
imply knowledge of how it exists, and it is upon the latter problem that 
Hume focuses. 
The problem is dealt with in terms of the 'inner/outerY dichotomy. 
Where does Hume think values are, inside or outside? On the one hand 
he is as willing as anyone else to ascribe values to outer objects, but at 
the same time he thinks that there would be no values if things did not 
have a propensity to please or displease us. This is not to say merely that 
if things neither pleased nor displeased us we would not be aware of 
values; it is to make the stronger claim that in those circumstances values 
would simply not exist. Here then is a form of what some might think 
of as scepticism: a denial of the possibility of values in a world devoid 
of feeling. But it is plainly not a denial of the existence of values tout 
court, nor even a denial of the existence of the values in outer objects. 
Of course we see values as in outer objects, but Hume argues that they 
are there because we put them there, by our magical propensity to project 
our feelings into the world and to read them in the world as though they 
are other than our feelings at a distance from us, 
It is also appropriate to describe Hume's position as sceptical to the 
extent that he denies, as against Samuel Clarke, that reason has the power 
to discover values. But as regards this form of scepticism, there is in any 
case no disagreement between Hume and Reid. the central disagreement 
between the two men coricerns Hume's reductionist programme. Hume 
thinks that talk about values can be rewritten, without remainder, as talk 
about feelings, and Reid says othenvise. But has to be noted that Hume's 
reductionist programme is not on the same analytic leve1 as Reid's 
common sense account, for Hume's programme presupposes the com- 
mon sense position that Reid and everyone else espouse. Hume grants 
al1 the obvious things, and asks what explanation could be given of why 
things appear to us the way they do, whereas Reid skirts round but does 
not ask the question that really interests Hume. The point can be expres- 
sed in terms of the difference between the phenomenological and the 
metaphysical facts of the case. There is a phenomenology of values, and 
a metaphysic of values. Hume and Reid agree about the phenomeno- 
logical facts, but it is only Hume, of the two men, who delves into the 
metaphysical facts, and provides a serious account of the mode of exis- 
tence of values, an account which focuses upon the inner life, the feelings 
of approval and disapproval, the pleasures and pains, a focus which 
causes Reid to think that Hume, contrary to common sense, was actually 
locating values in the inner person and not in the world. Hume as we 
have seen was doing no such thing. It was feelings that were being located 
within, not values. Hume did not think that because a landscape caused 
him to pleasure, it was he and not the landscape that was beautiful! 
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Earlier 1 characterised Hume's position as nominalist, and 1 should 
like here to clarify this characterization. His account of the nature of 
values in terms of our feelings is nominalist in the sense that a pheno- 
menon, a value, which we naturally think of as extemal to ourselves is 
presented in that account as an inner state read into the world, so that 
when we meet with it it is at a distance from us and so to say confronts 
us as something in the order of extemal things and independent of us, 
much as the necessity which we see to connect events related as cause 
and effect is an inner state read into the world, so that when we meet 
with it it is at a distance from ourselves and so to say confronts us as 
something in the order of externa1 things and independent of us. Never- 
theless Hume is realist in the sense that he does not deny that values really 
exist; in the way just described values are in the world and confront us. 
But, as is now clear, this realist position is not so much a metaphysical 
position as a phenomenological one. We might almost say that Hume 
is realist about the plenomena and nominalist about reality. As regards 
the realist aspect of this history, Hume is neither more nor less realist 
than Reid is, but Hume's nomination takes him a step beyond Reid 
because Reid does not ask himself the metaphysical question that elicits 
from Hume the nominalist reply. 
It should also be clear from this exposition of Hume's doctrine, that 
the common sense position, maintained by al1 people of sound mind, is 
realist in the sense that it describes how things really appear to us and 
therefore it is also Hume's position. But whereas most people stop at that 
sort of realism, Hume saw that it was precisely that position that calls 
for metaphysical investigation. 
Nevertheless, we have noted that Reid produces al least one powerful 
argument in support of his own and against Hume; that is his argument 
from language. Reid may be on shaky ground when he pleads that al1 
lmguages point towards his doctrine and away from Hume's, but there 
is no doubt that Reid's own languages, English and Latin at least, appear 
tobe on jis side. How might Hume reply to that line of attack? 
1 think that Hume would question the applicability of Reid's linguis- 
tic methodology to the metaphysical issues. Naturally our language 
reflects our experienceof reality, an experience with Hume and Reid 
share. They agreeabout such facts as that there are in the world distinct 
substances with attributes, that causally linked events are connected 
necessarily, that we sometimes feel duty bound to perform given sorts 
of act and to eschew others, and that some things in this world are 
beautiful, others ugly. That is how our world appears to us is not some- 
thing for which Hume requires proof, whether linguistic or otherwise. 
Instead he asks why the world appears to us in this and not in some other 
way. And the latter is a question to whose answer language provides no 
clue if, as Reid believes, language merely reflects our experience of the 
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world. For if that is the order of things, first our experience of the world 
and then language with its broader categories, its grammar and its vo- 
cabulary, then language does no more than reflect the data that them- 
selves demand philosophical study. We can so to say read the problems 
off language, but we cannot read the answers off it. The situation would 
be otherwise if linguistic categories, proper names, predicates, and so on, 
were seen not as reflecting experience but as detennining it. For in so 
far as our experience of the world is structured by linguistic categories 
then we ought to be able to leam about basic features of the experienced 
world by a consideration of our language. 
This quasi-Kantian manner of understanding the role of language in 
its relation to experience, a manner which is basic to Frege's philosophy, 
and also Wittgunstein's, is not however at al1 similar to that of Hume 
and Reid. Because it treated language as reflecting experience, not sha- 
ping it, the common sense philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment was 
bound to see language as supporting the common sense position, and on 
the other hand the nominalist Hume was bound to see language as 
irrelevant. Language reflects what we are al1 agreed upon, and Hume, 
in wonderment at what we are agreed upon, institutes a metaphysical 
enquiry into what we al1 share. We see the world as containing things 
of value, and we speak of the value of those things as if it were a quality 
of the things and inhering in them. That is how we speak about value 
because that is how we see value, that is, as confronting us as if it were 
something distinct from us and independent, when in metaphysical fact 
it is neither of these things. 
Hume's philosophical masterpiece A Treatise of Human Nature has 
the subtitle Being An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of 
Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Its discussion of the nature of values is 
a clear example of the experimental method of reasoning. The investi- 
gation is not deductive, but starts instead from the phenomena, in this 
case from the fact that we ascribe value to things,and it observes that 
however hard we look we neves seem to seethe value in things, any more 
than we see in or between causally related events the necessity of their 
connection. This draws Hume on to consider the role of the perceiver 
and he focuses upon the idea that the term 'values' should be treated not 
as a noun but as a verb. To say that something has a value is to say that 
we value it. Value, then should be thought of not as a mere accident 
inherent in an object, but as an act, something that we do, and this 
prompts the question of the kind of act valuing is. This leads directly 
to an investigation of the affective part of our nature, and to the con- 
clusion, which can be rea.ched only by the 'experimental method of 
reasoning', that we do, as a basic fact of our nature, respond with one 
kind of affection or feeling to some sorts of thing, and with other sorts 
of affection or feeling to other sorts of thing. Why we should value certain 
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things and not others cannot in the end be answer except by saying that 
that is our nature - that is how we are. Had we been otherwise we would 
no doubt have valued things othenvise, though in what wise we cannot 
say a priori; we would need to employ the experimental method of 
reasoning. 
However, for Hume valuing is not a matter of feeling only; it is 
central to his account that there is also aprojective act through which we 
see the value as existing not in us but in what we value, and as existing 
independently of us. This projection grounds the possibility of the value 
realism which Hume shares with al1 other people, including the Scottish 
common sense philosophers. 
To sum up: 1 think that Hume's value philosophy survives Reid's 
powerful attack. Essentially Reid takes his stand on value realism, and 
complains that Hume is not a realist; and if 1 am right, Hume's reply 
is simply that he is a realist in precisely the sense in which Reid is, but 
that the philosophal questions which Hume tackles after his acceptance 
of that realism and as a result of that acceptance. 
In considering the dispute between Hume and Reid, it is difficult not 
to recall arguments which have taken place in this century between 
defenders of cognitivist and of noncognitivist theories of value, and 
particulary between the emotivists and their opponents. Many of the 
terms of the recent debates replicate those of the earlier one 1 have been 
examining, but as regards clarity of observation, depth of insight, and 
subtlty of argument, 1 do not believe that a great deal has occurred in 
the twentieth century debate that matches the wntings of Hume and Reid, 
those two most formidable protagonists of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
